EXHIBIT 15

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2	UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
3	SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
4	Case No. 05-44481
5	x
6	In the Matter of:
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8	DELPHI CORPORATION,
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10	Debtor.
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12	x
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14	U.S. Bankruptcy Court
15	One Bowling Green
16	New York, New York
17	
18	March 1, 2007
19	10:13 a.m.
20	
21	BEFORE:
22	HON. ROBERT D. DRAIN
23	U.S. BANKRUPTCY JUDGE
24	
25	

2 1 CLAIMS Objection Hearing Regarding Claim of Eva Orlik 2 3 CLAIMS Objection Hearing Regarding Claim of Joseph Reno 4 CLAIMS Objection Hearing Regarding Claim of DBM Technologies, 5 6 LLC 7 8 CLAIMS Objection Hearing Regarding Claim of Edith James 9 10 CLAIMS Objection Hearing Regarding Claim of Freddie L. Johnson 11 12 CLAIMS Objection Hearing Regarding Claim of Terrence Evans 13 14 CLAIMS Objection Hearing Regarding Claim of Thomas 15 Wimsatt/Donna Wilson 16 CLAIMS Objection Hearing Regarding Claim of Harold Woodson 17 18 19 CLAIMS Objection Hearing Regarding Claim of LaborSource 2000, 20 Inc. 21 22 23 24 Transcribed By: Esther Accardi 25

purchase order nor this agreement create any obligation of Delphi to purchase, obtain or pay for any minimum number of hours of any personnel. And supplier and Delphi agree that Delphi is under no such obligation. In addition, nothing contained in this agreement limits in any manner Delphi's right to reduce Delphi's requirements of supplier or to terminate the purchase order in accordance with its terms including without limitation Delphi's termination right in accordance with Section 13 of the Delphi Terms and Conditions January 2001, which have been and remain incorporated in the purchase order by reference." In addition, in paragraph 3 of the settlement agreement the supplier released Delphi of all claims arising and relating in any way to the purchase order based upon acts or occurrences at any time prior to the date of the settlement agreement. Finally, the supplier, in paragraph 2, ratified and confirmed its obligations to provide the services in accordance with terms of the purchase order, as amended, in accordance with this agreement and represented and warranted to Delphi that the supplier had no offsets or defenses to the obligation of supplier to perform under the purchase order, as amended, in accordance with the agreement.

Consequently, it appears to me crystal clear that,
consistent with the bid and the purchase order, the parties
reconfirmed in their amendment to the purchase order that their
contractual arrangement was a requirements contract and that

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among other things Delphi had no obligation to pay for any minimum number of hours to the supplier. And, of course, that is the basis for the supplier's claim.

As set forth in the Little Caesar's case, the parol evidence rule as applied in Michigan excludes the admission of parol evidence where the parties' intent that a written instrument be the complete expression of their agreement is clear on the face of the agreement. That is the case here, not only based on the terms that I have read but also by the integration provisions and no-modification provisions of the agreement which, again, the Little Caesar's case refers to as barring parol evidence. See Little Ceasar's, 210 F.3d at 656-57. Such a requirements contract is recognized as valid and enforceable in or under Michigan law, even if no requirements arose because of cancellation or termination, see J&B Sausage Co. v. Dep't of Mgmt & Budget, Docket No. 259230, 2007 WL 28409, (Mich. Ct. App. Jan. 4, 2007), as well as Tigg Corp. v. Dow Corning Corp., 962 F.2d 1119, 1126 (3d Cir. 1992), and Neofotistos v. Harvard Brewing Co., 341 Mass. 684, 689 (1961) for other constructions of requirements contracts. The only limitation on that rule is that the contracting party act in good faith in respect of its requirements. However, the evidence here does not show any absence of good faith by DAS. Indeed, I don't believe an absence of good faith is alleged. Moreover, the letter dated March 3, 2005 by Mr. Sharplee to Mr.

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Robins states, among other things, "perhaps there was nothing that could have been done to prevent these events from occurring from Delphi's perspective," that is the losses that occurred because of the overall nature of the project. So I conclude that Delphi acted in good faith and that its requirements contract should be enforced pursuant to its terms. And, in fact, it was performed according to its terms, there being no dispute that Delphi has paid and performed all of its obligations under the agreement.

LaborSource alleges that the 2004 amendment to that agreement in the settlement agreement and amendment was a contract of adhesion and therefore should be disregarded.

Again, except for the evidence in the record as set forth in the whereas clauses in the 2004 amendment that LaborSource was experiencing financial difficulties, there's no other evidence that DAS was acting in bad faith or in an unconscionable way in not paying LaborSource in excess of the amounts that it had agreed to pay LaborSource under the contracts. Consequently, I conclude that the amendment and settlement agreement is not a contract of adhesion and is enforceable, and, further, that it is merely a confirmation except for the changes to the amounts that Delphi would pay (those changes being to LaborSource's benefit), of the underlying requirements nature of the contract between the parties.

Finally, I note that even if there were ambiguities